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This paper asks how information should flow among networked entities in NCOW. In 
particular, should the entities actively seek, acquire and process relevant information or 
should they wait to react to information that others send to them? In short, should they 
pull information or should they rely upon others to push information to them? In most 
tactical contexts, smart push will improve efficiency by orders of magnitude compared to 
smart pull. Our analysis reveals that efficient information processing chains require a 
general capability to watch for key events. Humans and the computer applications 
supporting them will use this capability to detect events matching conditions of interest 
they specify. This capability plays a key role in transforming networks into integrated 
value chains. Where traditional networks aim at supporting unregulated exchanges for 
data bit flows best suited to random access and unpredictable process sequences, the 
capability to delegate condition monitoring enables us to transform networks into 
conveyers of timely, valuable information. To maximize efficiency, we must use 
processes where each successive step receives just such valuable information as its input. 
Thus, condition monitoring and its associated smart push constitute a required foundation 
for the efficient process chains needed to achieve information superiority. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
Two basic alternatives exist for providing needed inputs to process steps, whether we are 
discussing supply chains of material goods or information processing chains associated 
with decision-making and control. Processing entities1 can seek out relevant inputs and, 
upon finding them, procure them. Or the entities can inform suppliers of their 
requirements and depend on the suppliers to deliver needed inputs at the right time and 
place. A major shift occurred in manufacturing over the last two decades associated with 
“just in time” (JIT) approaches and “supply chain integration.” Top-performing 
enterprises shifted from the former process design approach to the latter one. When 
suppliers have an excellent understanding of their customers’ processes, schedules, and 
ongoing process state, they can deliver valued inputs just when they are needed. In 
manufacturing, this reduces costs in significant ways, especially by reducing inventory 
and work in process (WIP) that consume space, time, and processing resources associated 
with storing, searching, and moving around those items not immediately required by the 
next processing stage. Thus, inappropriate or low quality inputs, as well as inputs 
received at an inopportune time, increase costs and may actually represent negative value. 
 
Systems designed to produce quality decisions have many parallels with manufacturing 
systems, though the former work by adding value to “bits” where the latter add value by 
transforming “molecules.” The key to high performance, in both cases, is to produce the 
most valued products as efficiently as possible. Value reflects the degree to which the 
products embody superior features and qualities and get to “market” promptly. 
Efficiency, on the other hand, means producing these valued products with a minimal 
consumption of resources.  To achieve that efficiency we use the best tools within well-
designed processes. Usually, we improve efficiency by eliminating as many sources of 
friction as possible that consume resources unnecessarily or increase latency. Friction 
may be physical or virtual, as when differences in information systems introduce delays 
and difficulties in accomplishing successive steps. 
 
In moving to network-centric operations and warfare (NCOW), the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has recognized the importance of reducing friction that makes sharing of 
information between different entities difficult. When information isn’t represented in a 
standardized way, an entity that wants to find it, procure it, and apply it can incur major 
delays and difficulties. So, DoD is moving to make all information readily locatable, 
readable, and interpretable (Wolfowitz, 2004). It hopes to establish consensual meta-data 
schemas to accomplish this. Even if this approach works, it leaves the question of 
information logistics still unanswered: how can the information supply chain be 
integrated most efficiently? In particular, should decision-makers seek out and pull the 
information they need, or should suppliers push the right information to them at the right 
place and at the right time? 
 
                                                 
1 Some entities that make decisions and perform actions are human and others are information-processing 
machines. When the military performers are humans, we often call them operators. Frequently, we’ll just 
use the abstract term “processing entity” to ignore the nature of the process performer. 
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The current approach to the design of the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG) and its 
Network-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) emphasizes pull. The work being done by 
my colleagues at the World-Wide Consortium for the Grid (W2COG) and me, on the 
other hand, focuses on the alternative approach. In our approach, networks are designed 
to optimize information logistics by implementing what we call Valuable Information at 
the Right Time (VIRT). In this approach, suppliers work with intelligent computing 
machinery to determine which bits should flow to which consumers, thereby integrating 
the information supply chain in a manner parallel to the recent advances in 
manufacturing.  
 
This paper aims to clarify the two alternatives and expose the conditions under which 




The information logistics2 problem is concerned with optimizing the flow of bits to 
processing entities distributed across a network. We could formalize this, but it’s 
probably most useful to provide an informal, intuitive characterization of the problem. 
We consider any number of information producers, who can operate on various inputs to 
produce information outputs and, in addition, any number of decision-makers that 
convert selected inputs into outputs that correspond to choices. Some of those choices 
might trigger actions, through coupling to effectors. Other choices become information 
inputs to additional processing entities. Some of the entities are people and some are 
machines or software programs running on machines.  
 
In all systems various limitations constrain attainable results. In most of the distributed 
systems we are concerned with, constraints limit how much can be done, how well, and 
how quickly. If we are trying to conduct a battle or minimize casualties from a natural 
disaster, we typically have too few people, too little time, too little information, and too 
little available computing resources. Different systems in different contexts will 
experience these constraints in different orders, but the constraint induced by limited 
human processing resources typifies crisis response situations. The information logistics 
challenge is to optimize the quality of results obtained by such a system when resource 
constraints limit its effectiveness. The essential question facing system designers is how 
should we select and sequence information for each processing entity to maximize the 
value of our results?  
 
Very complex systems can’t be analyzed and optimized using a closed form approach. 
We must rely upon heuristics to guide our design in such cases. One obvious heuristic to 
embrace in systems of the sort being considered is as follows: “Whenever possible, favor 
behaviors that make better decisions faster.” Equivalently, we want to design processes 
that improve the quality of decisions and increase the speed of decision-making.   
 
For our analysis, we suppose that valued results are produced through the application of 
systematic processes. For example, manufacturers make many different mixes and 
                                                 
2 Distributed information logistics is introduced and explained in Chow, et al. (2000). 
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different products as a result of each product instance flowing through a set of process 
steps specified for that type of product. In a similar way, we view information processing 
systems as producing information products. These products include decisions and 
associated actions, resulting from a series of process steps applied to appropriate inputs. 
A number of steps are performed by people, and others are accomplished by 
computerized agents. Regardless of the type of processing entity, each step transforms 
input information into output information. The quality of the output can be assessed along 
various attributes. The single best measure, where we can obtain it, would be the value of 
the information. The value of an interim result corresponds to the expected improvement 
in eventual final products attributable to it. If final results improve because some interim 
decision was reached, the increase attributable to that decision is its value. While difficult 
to measure precisely, estimation of value added is a routine part of all mature supply 
chains. Processing steps and interim results that don’t improve expected outcomes may 
have zero or negative value, because they consume resources without producing benefit. 
 
In short, information logistics addresses the question of how information should flow 
among processing entities to optimize the value attained. While no definitive optimum 
may be obtainable, heuristics employed in supply chain integration seem applicable to the 
flow of information in NCOW chains. Some of these heuristics are listed below: 
    Desirable Behaviors 
− Keep your most specialized, expensive processing entities busy 
− Minimize lateness on the most valuable, time-sensitive products 
− Drop low-value products before sacrificing high-value ones 
− Minimize product quality problems that ensue from low-quality inputs 
− Minimize time lost to set-up and cut-over required to handle changes in 
products or changes in inputs 
    Undesirable Behaviors 
− Load your processing entities with more inputs than they can process 
− Allow some of your required processing entities to wait for needed inputs 
− Make processing entities filter out low-quality inputs 
− Make processing entities prioritize backlogged tasks 
− Make processing entities adapt to input variability 
Thus, the basic strategy in achieving optimum product output is to allocate as much of 
your resources as possible to adding value, working on the highest value tasks where 
possible. Actions or interim results that waste time, waste processing resources, or 
produce little or no value should be avoided. While this may not achieve a provable 
optimum result, systems that adhere to these heuristics clearly outperform those that do 
not. As a consequence, we will prefer the better systems to the poorer ones, moving up 
so-called Pareto frontiers as high as possible.  
 
 In the simplest, most extreme form, there are two alternative approaches to the question 
of managing information flow in these distributed NCOW systems:  
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¾ Theory 1: Describe all information available using some type of meta-data 
description. Give each processing entity good search tools. Have each entity 
seek and acquire whatever information it needs, when and as needed. 
¾ Theory 2: Have each processing entity describe conditions that would make 
its current plans undesirable, because those conditions would contradict 
assumptions needed to justify the choice of the affected plan. Enable agents to 
alert the affected entity. Enable the alerted entity to respond quickly to the 
received news. 
 
In my classes, I have referred to these two approaches simply as Theory 1 and Theory 2. 
Here, however, we might benefit from recognizing that the first is actually a “pull” 
approach to information logistics, whereas the second is a “push” approach. In each case, 
when the tools and computing software exploit domain semantics, ontologies, rules of 
inference and similar elements of artificial intelligence to improve understanding and 
performance, we can readily refer to these as “smart,” “intelligent” or “knowledge-
based.”  So when an operator in a Theory 1 system can ask for all recent reports about the 
geographic quadrant he currently occupies, the query processor can employ much 
knowledge and intelligent reasoning. Similarly, if an operator posts a planned route of 
flight, altitude, and expected waypoint times, an agent that filters spatially and temporally 
relevant pilot reports would illustrate a degree of intelligent push. 
 
So both approaches can simplify the work imposed upon a human operator by enabling 
that operator to express queries in terms of high-level semantic concepts and domain-
relevant conditions of interest. As a consequence, our analysis will mostly ignore any 
questions of whether or how knowledge-based intelligent processing might be performed. 
Another path we won’t explore concerns various ways to mix the two approaches. 
Instead, we want to focus on the relevant strengths and weaknesses of pull v. push 
approaches to the information logistics question. Our purpose is to develop a crisp 




Theory 1 is mostly consistent with current US architecture and management directives. 
Its proponents have been motivated by several observations. First, the US has notorious 
difficulty sharing information in a timely way, especially from intelligence sources to 
diverse military and homeland defense operators (National Commission, 2004). 
Significant backlogs of intelligence observations often sit for long periods before analysts 
can work their way through them. As a result, intelligence data often don’t get to people 
while they’re still current and valuable. The former DoD CIO, John Stenbit, 
recommended a new information logistics process that posts data as soon as they’re 
available, even before analysts could interpret them and convert “data” into 
“information” (Ackerman, 2003). Further, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz issued a directive mandating that all DOD entities possessing potentially 
useful data should describe those data using an appropriate XML meta-data schema as a 
first step toward enabling all operators to find and access those data (Wolfowitz, 2004). 
These steps have been leveraged by the DoD National Information Infrastructure (NII) 
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plans for the Global Information Grid and Network-Centric Enterprise Services (Stenbit, 
2004). In their thinking, information superiority will be achieved by providing excellent 
search tools so that each operator can find and acquire information needed. 
 
Theory 2 was implicit in some of my earlier papers, such as [Hayes-Roth, 2004a, 2004b, 
2005a]. It represents a strategy for exploiting the exponential increase in the processing 
capacity of machines to enable humans with fixed, finite capacities to benefit from 
increasingly vast quantities of relevant data. Theory 2 aims to mitigate what humans 
experience as the “data glut.” Seeing the similarity between manufacturing supply chains 
and information decision chains also motivates us to ask how we can emulate the 
efficiencies of just-in-time processes with lean, low-inventory processes. The challenge 
in achieving this kind of low-friction, efficient integration in manufacturing has been to 
make suppliers adapt their products and methods to optimize their customers’ 
performance. This requires that suppliers get smart about how their customers use the 
suppliers’ products and how users’ costs can be minimized. As a simple example, FedEx 
discovered that customers needed to schedule and track shipping from their own 
premises, so FedEx moved those capabilities to the customers’ workstations and adapted 
their own systems, schedules, and services so the customers themselves could view and 
control them. Thus, while shipping services were outsourced, each customer actually 
brought more control of adapted shipping capabilities into their own processes. 
 
The VIRT methodology assumes information supply chains are restructured in a manner 
akin to such manufacturing supply chain adaptations. In particular, it assumes that 
suppliers of information learn what customers actually need to know and provide just that 
information to them. Intelligent agents, playing the role of information brokers, accept 
statements from processing entities or operators describing “conditions of interest” 
(COIs). These conditions describe potential events that would motivate the operators to 
change their planned actions to achieve better outcomes.  
 
As an example, consider a helicopter pilot intending to fly a particular route in hostile 
territory. During planning, the pilot plots a low risk route. Subsequently, new 
observations about anti-aircraft emplacements along the planned route of flight would 
match one of the pilot’s COIs.  
 
In short, Theory 2 assumes many processing entities have a continuous need to know 
about things that undercut their previous decisions by violating some assumptions on 
which those decisions depend. Operators engaged in real-time plan execution consider 
such information vital and urgent. Those attributes, significance and timeliness, make the 
information high-value. Theory 2 sees information logistics as the challenge of (1) 
getting high-value information quickly to operators who are dependent on it and (2) 
assuring operators give priority to received high-value information so they adapt and 
achieve better outcomes. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 below diagram simple functional models of the value chains associated 
with the two different types of processing organizations. These models use a lot of 
informal shorthand to make them simple and easy to read. The first model is centered on 
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the Processing Entities PE1,…, PEk that do work. The PEs add value by accessing various 
information sources IS1,…, ISn to produce valued products labeled v. Each PE acquires 
its inputs through interaction with a Query Specifier (QS). The function q on the link 
between the PE and QS represents the transaction that yields information products from 
QS with various levels of efficiency. So, for example, we can assume q gives a lot of 
information at low cost, as most query processing systems do. Google, for example, gives 
thousands of relevant answers to most queries.  
 
The rest of the process works roughly as follows. Once a query is specified, the 
transaction p translates the query into a query plan by working with the Query Planner 
(QP). The transaction p just passes back the responses to the query through QS and then 
through q.  The Query Planner uses various Information Directories (IDj) to understand 
what kinds of information are available and how to access them. Information Stores (ISn) 
store, manage and access discrete bodies of information. The processes used by QP are 
labeled r and s, representing the transactions that seek and retrieve relevant information 
needed to answer the query. 
 
Simple model of Theory 1 
 
Figure 1. A value chain of processing entities PEi producing products v 
as a result of specifying queries and planning and executing those 
queries through information directories to various information sources. 
 
Simple model of Theory 2 
 
Figure 2. A value chain of processing entities PEi producing products v 
as a result of specifying and monitoring COIs and then reacting 
adaptively to alerts. 
 
The second model is very similar, and it too focuses on the same Processing Entities 
PE1,…, PEk that add value by accessing various information sources IS1,…, ISn to 
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enabling each PE to inform the system about the COIs the system should continuously 
monitor. Each PE conveys its needs through interaction with a Condition Specifier (CS). 
The function c on the link between the PE and CS represents the transaction that yields 
information products consistent with PE’s specification. So for example, we can assume c 
gives a minimal amount of information at low cost, because the PE specifies precisely 
what type of events it must be concerned with.  
 
The rest of the process works roughly as follows. Once a condition is specified, the CS 
conveys it to the Condition Monitor (CM) through w, and CM takes responsibility for 
monitoring it. The transaction w just passes back any new events matching the condition 
through CS and then through c.  The Condition Monitor uses various Information 
Directories (IDj) to understand what kinds of information are available and how to access 
them. Information Stores (ISn) store, manage and access discrete bodies of information. 
The processes used by CM are labeled r and s, representing the transactions that seek and 
retrieve relevant information.  
 
Let’s compare the two models. While Condition Monitoring differs a bit internally from 
Query Planning, the two functions use information directories and information sources in 
nearly identical ways. Thus the real differences between Models 1 and 2 are in the 
efficiency of Model 1’s u, q, and p in comparison to Model 2’s t, c, and w. In fact, we can 
simplify the analysis by viewing the valued products in each case as the output of 
composing the corresponding functions, so that: 
 In Model 1,   v = u ○ q ○ p (K),  
and in Model 2,  v =  t ○ c ○ w (K),  
where K denotes all available information and meta-data .  
We read these informal equations to say, in the case of the first model for example, the 
value produced (v) equals what u extracts from what q extracts from what p extracts from 
all available information and meta-data. Equivalently, p finds relevant information in K 
and passes it to the next process step; this step applies q to find and pass along relevant 
information; finally, the process step u finds and identifies the valued information v. 
 
For our analysis, we’re assuming the valued products v are the same under the two 
models. These would correspond to identified threats requiring a helicopter pilot to divert 
from planned course, for example, or other “needles in the haystack” that operators 
would find worthy of selecting to act upon. In such a context, then, the two models 
produce the same end result, but Model 1 forces the Processing Entity to consider 
through process u vastly more inputs that result from query q. In Model 2, on the other 
hand, the Processing Entity has defined a precise COI that would materially affect 
expected outcomes. This means that the Processing Entity can mostly pass through 
results of c, eliminating any need for t to perform filtering and prioritization. 
 
Let’s consider a quantitative example. “Threats” that might affect a helicopter pilot can 
be natural or man-made in origin. The natural category would include high terrain, poor 
visibility, excessive winds, thunderstorms, or icing. Of course, these only affect the pilot 
if they intersect the helicopter’s route of flight. Man-made threats include ground-based 
anti-aircraft weapons, fixed or mobile surveillance assets, and enemy aircraft. These may 
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pose a threat if the helicopter’s route intersects the volume of space these systems can 
observe or reach. When we speak of “intersecting,” we mean the threat occupies the same 
space at the same time as the helicopter. So, to compare our two models, let’s look at a 
helicopter pilot who’s concerned about these possible threats intersecting the planned 
route of flight. 
 
The terrain phenomena are relatively static, so there’s little value in considering terrain 
data repeatedly, unless the pilot changes the route of flight some time after planning it. In 
that case, terrain previously considered benign may become a threat. On the other hand, 
weather changes constantly so weather data are worth considering continuously. 
Similarly, enemy assets may move around and allied intelligence may also improve its 
estimate of their positions and capabilities. For this reason, information about enemy 
capabilities deserves continuous consideration. 
 
So how do the two alternative models address these needs? Each needs to look for 
relevant information and determine if it’s significant.  Information about the different 
phenomena is represented in various ways, but a good simplification is that all 
phenomena are modeled as values of appropriate variables stored in some gridded 
geospatially indexed array. For example, winds aloft are reported in terms of direction 
and speed at each latitude-longitude grid coordinate, at each of several corresponding 
altitudes (such as 3000’, 6000’, 9000’, etc.) The coarseness of the grid mesh differs for 
different types of variables in different types of systems. Usually, the geospatial data in 
one data array represent the expected values of the corresponding variable at a particular 
time. Data values that are forecast for different points in the future are stored in different 
arrays, each corresponding to one forecast time. When users need values that are 
intermediate between grid points or time points, they normally interpolate between 
adjacent values of the variable of interest. 
 
In a small square-shaped theater of operations that might measure 200 km on a side, let’s 
consider how much data is available. Let’s assume that all grid meshes are 1 km, so that 
we have 40,000 grid points for each variable corresponding to each pair of latitude and 
longitude grid coordinates. We’ll assume that in the vertical dimension we have data for 
every 500 m, from 0 (sea level) up to 6 km altitude, for a total of 13 altitude coordinates. 
Thus, for each variable of interest, for each moment in time, we have about 500K data 
values. Let’s consider missions that last 4.5 hrs for which we have forecast values for 
each 30 min, so initially we have 10 distinct time coordinates. This means that initially, 
our data universe is 5M values for each variable of interest.  We’ll assume that we want 
to monitor just 10 variables in total, so that means 50 M values form our base of 
potentially relevant variable values. Normally, data are updated, based on new 
information and estimates, at least twice per hour, which means that every thirty minutes 
all of the data might potentially change. Because changes occur mostly asynchronously, 
the best strategy is to revisit the data of interest periodically, to be able to notice and 
respond quickly to important changes. Let’s assume that our pilot decides to reexamine 
data every 10 minutes throughout a 4.5 hr mission.  
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Model 1 suggests, then, that the pilot should retrieve all relevant data every 10 minutes. 
The data of interest are all values of the 10 variables that intersect the planned route of 
flight, in the sense of overlapping spatial volume of capability with the helicopter, at the 
same time3.  For simplification, we’ll assume that 10% of the total data universe 
corresponds to the points in space and time where interactions might occur, if the 
variables indicate a threat such as a thunderstorm or enemy aircraft. So every 10 minutes, 
the pilot’s queries access and retrieve through processes r 10% of 50M values, perhaps 
further reducing them by 90% using filters in q to exclude insignificant items from all the 
relevant data values retrieved. This means that about 1% of 50M values are returned to 
the pilot, or 500 K relevant and significant data values4. Usually, a tiny fraction of these 
will justify a change in plan. Most of these values, in fact, won’t make a significant 
difference in expected outcome for the pilot. In addition, the pilot’s own process u will be 
overtaxed by this volume of data queued for human processing. As a result, most of the 
data will be ignored, reactions will be suboptimal, and the pilot will feel continually 
stressed by the repeated onslaught of data deluges arriving every 10 min.  
 
In contrast, Model 2 suggests that the processing system should take responsibility for 
monitoring COIs that would probably motivate and justify adaptive responses. These 
conditions correspond to changes in expected values of variables that the plan depends on 
for its success. So, for example, if there’s no risk associated with faster than expected 
ground speeds that could result from favorable tail winds, there’s no reason to monitor 
for tail winds. As another example, if fuel reserves are provided for 90 minutes beyond 
expected flight duration and are allowed to go as low as 45 minutes in all cases, only 
strong headwinds are worthy of considering. In fact, the system could compute the 
expected impact of headwinds on total flight time and only alert the pilot when the 
threshold of 45 minutes fuel reserve is in jeopardy. As another example, data on enemy 
capabilities that confirm previously considered information are insignificant to the pilot, 
because the system is looking for new threats.  
 
Model 2 exploits its awareness of the pilot’s prior and current knowledge, in addition to 
the pilot’s plan, to drastically reduce the information passed to the pilot. The model 
allows the pilot to convey that understanding through process c where the pilot 
formulates specific COIs. Simplifying a bit, the PE asks the system to notify it of changes 
in expected values, i.e. events, which negate or make questionable the ability of the PE to 
perform its mission successfully. In the current example, over each 10 minute interval the 
pilot will probably receive zero or a very small number of alerts stating that some 
variable values have changed in significant ways. The pilot, in Model 2, has plenty of 
                                                 
3 The planned route occupies a series of 3D points over time. The data of interest describe variable values at 
3D points over time. The two sources are intersected over the 4D coordinates of space-time.  
4 In today’s best systems human processing capabilities are optimized by presenting much geospatially 
indexed data graphically as multi-colored maps. This allows the human perceptual system to process much 
data in parallel and detect interesting phenomena visually. We’re ignoring special processing capabilities of 
particular machinery so we can focus on the more essential question of how to assure high-value 
information flows and represents an extremely high proportion of all communicated bits. All of the 
human’s processing capabilities are limited, and they should not be squandered processing low-value 
inputs. 
Hayes-Roth, Two Theories: Smart Push v. Smart Pull  p. 11  
mental cycles available to handle these rare and important alerts. Furthermore, the low 
rate of data avoids stressing the pilot, and that further enhances human performance. 
 
So Model 2 reduces the volume of information being communicated and also reduces the 
amount of work that the PE has to perform. This makes a PE in Model 2 much more 
efficient than in Model 1. In our example, Model 2 reduces the input volume to the PE by 
a factor of more than 100,000 (five orders of magnitude). If the PE in Model 1 had huge 
processing capacity, it could perhaps produce all desired valuable outputs v, just as well 
as in Model 2.  Model 1 requires applying the “needle-in-the-haystack-finding” process u 
to about 500K items, every 10 minutes.  This requires u to operate on 3M items suggested 
by the smart, excellent query p every hour. Typically, however, the PE is resource 
limited, because PE is a human and has limited cognitive bandwidth. Suppose 10% of the 
pilot’s mental capacity is available for this task, and that humans can consider 10 
significant variable values a minute. In an hour, the pilot could consider 600 reported 
relevant variable values, or just 1/50th of 1 % of all the retrieved information. Obviously, 
the pilot’s response will reflect a rather random or arbitrary selection of the relevant 
information.  
 
Model 2, however, requires that the pilot consider a small number of items, almost 
always well below the cognitive processing limits. Model 2 achieves this efficiency by 
conveying to condition monitoring agents a lot of “context” about the operator. For 
example, the Condition Monitor can take a set of assumed routes, way points, and 
required meteorological conditions for each pilot and continually compare and contrast 
the forecast weather with the required conditions. Only when weather degrades relative to 
a particular pilot’s requirements for a specific route at a specific time and place would the 
CM need to transmit data back to the PE. In contrast, a system built around Theory 1 
would require the pilot to ask for weather information periodically, to determine which 
returned values had changed significantly and, finally, to calculate which had degraded to 
a point where the expectable mission outcome would no longer be acceptable.5  Theory 2 
suggests that all of that work should be avoided, and Model 2 shows that it can be 
avoided at low cost by delegating context-aware condition monitoring, as performed by 
CM. 
 
Are there any situations where Model 1 is as efficient as Model 2 or even better? Yes 
there are. Model 2’s superiority depends upon an ability to delegate to an agent the 
responsibility for monitoring all key assumptions expressed in terms of COIs. This 
                                                 
5 In this analysis, to make Model 1 as efficient as possible, we’ve assumed that the queries could be 
personalized and contextualized so that only relevant values of variables would be provided to the pilot. 
Thus, we’ve assumed in implementing Theory 1, the information universe would be honed to a small 
number of variables of interest and, further, that the values returned would be restricted to those where 
forecast values in space-time intersect with planned space-time coordinates for the flight. These 
assumptions go well beyond what actual systems offer or what is even being anticipated among Theory 1 
practitioners. However, such improvements are logically independent of the particular Theory. We are 
incorporating these improvements by assumption in Model 1 to make any claims for Theory 2’s advantages 
more vulnerable to rejection. The primary weather information systems for pilots, as just one example, 
afford pilots none of these beneficial improvements. By imagining Theory 1 is made as efficient as 
possible, we avoid any bias in an analysis which ultimately favors Theory 2.  
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requires an understanding of how outcomes depend on various variables and conditions. 
It also depends on capabilities to monitor those variables and compute those conditions. 
Furthermore, the monitoring system must be informed when plans and underlying 
assumptions are changed. All of this works best in contexts where plans are produced and 
maintained in digital, symbolic systems, and where planning processes make explicit 
rationales supporting decisions and choices. The military has many operations where 
these conditions apply, as in most tactical planning, maneuver, and logistics. However, 
even in these cases, the formalization of semantic concepts (ontologies), conditions of 
interest, pertinent information directories and information sources has not progressed 
very far. 
 
So Model 1 seems to be a better fit for activities where people are engaged in less 
structured tasks, as when they are trying to become familiar with a new area, trying to 
build an initial understanding of a new situation, or when they are looking for ill defined 
patterns to emerge from massive amounts of data. In such situations, data mining 
algorithms and human intuition and perception can often be superior. Browsing, in the 
absence of some clear notion of what one is looking for, seems not to be a function where 
machines have much competitive capability. 
 
Internet search engines, such as Google, have shown that Model 1 can be extremely 
valuable, especially for a wide variety of users who collectively have overlapping 
interests. By suggesting to the next person who asks the answers that previous 
investigators tended to value, search engines offer considerable advantages in comparison 
to human, manual, or unordered search. Model 1 seems to make concrete the idea that 
there are Processing Entities, usually human, that value shot-gun answers to general 
questions.  
 
In contrast, Model 2 promises enormous increases in productivity for operations that are 
engaged in performing defined processes, repeatedly, where resources are limited and 
outcomes are important. In such cases, we may routinely need to let some potential 
opportunities “hit the floor,” and there’s great value in assuring effective prosecution of 
the most important objectives on time and within budget. In these contexts, we want our 
people attending only to important issues. We do not want them spending time scanning, 
browsing, filtering, and prioritizing incoming queues that are overflowing with relevant 
but mostly insignificant information, or managing growing backlogs of unfinished tasks. 
To maximize their productivity, we want their input queues to be automatically 
prioritized continually so that the next item they process is, in fact, the one that has the 
highest expected value added. Model 2 makes that the routine process management 
approach. 
 
MONITORING CONDITIONS OF INTEREST 
 
When bandwidth is limited, we want to use it wisely. In any given system, bandwidth can 
measure the maximum possible rate of information flow through some component. 
Usually, of course, we think of communications bandwidth, a measure of the capacity to 
transport bits from one place to another per unit time. In other systems, we think of CPU 
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clock rate or memory access rates, measures of the capacity to access or manipulate bits 
per unit time. As the preceding example illustrates, many processes depend on human 
thinking to succeed, but people can only consider a small number of variables or 
questions per unit time.  
 
All systems that process information exhibit an upper limit on the amount of useful work 
they can accomplish per unit time, because at some level of workload, one of their 
components hits its maximum rate of throughput. We refer to the component that limits 
the total system at that point as “the rate-limiting component” or “the gating factor.” 
After we exceed the capacity of the rate-limiting component, we incur other problems 
and costs. If inputs continue to arrive, they must either be stored in some temporary 
buffer, housed permanently in a more expensive or slower facility or, as often actually 
happens, they simply “hit the floor.” In that case, the inputs are damaged or lost, never to 
be recovered.   
 
When interacting with a dynamic environment or a quick enemy, it’s vital that our 
systems effectively focus on the most important inputs so they can implement adaptive 
responses before the environment or opponent creates the next problem requiring 
response. The basic idea in intelligent control is that one’s rate of considering and acting 
must be faster than the opponent’s. So, even when our systems have limited capacity, 
they must give priority to important information and assure their basic adaptive cycle is 
quick enough (Hayes-Roth, 2005c). As a result, many items may “hit the floor” when we 
act efficiently. However, we can’t afford to let chance determine which items the system 
ignores. Even when we have limited resources, we must attend to and respond to the most 
significant events. In our example above, the pilot in Model 1 couldn’t do this, because 
the deluge of inputs exceeded the resource capacity to recognize and act on the most 
significant information. 
To integrate efficient supply chains, suppliers learn what their customers need and how 
they should supply inputs to reduce the customers’ difficulty, cost, and delay (friction) in 
employing them. In our pursuit of NCOW and its corresponding information chain 
integration, we want to apply the same principles. This encourages us to focus on the 
basic function of supplying information to “customers.” By analogy to the supply chain, 
each processing entity should supply information in a manner that minimizes the friction 
incurred by the intended recipient. In addition, because most information chains will be 
rate-limited, every processing entity will need to attend first to the most important bits. If 
suppliers can prioritize information for them, processing entities can spend their limited 
resources more effectively, assuring they process important items before unimportant 
ones. In this way, the entire system can maximize the resources it expends processing the 
most vital bits. 
To support this basic objective, we want the system to assure that processing entities 
receive prioritized information in a form that simplifies the recipient’s task of 
understanding it and reacting to it adaptively. This is what Model 2 does by allowing 
each processing entity to specify its own conditions of interest. Each COI corresponds to 
a potential event that undercuts the expectation of a successful process or mission. One 
broad class of COIs logically corresponds to the negation of a prerequisite. For example, 
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sufficient fuel is a prerequisite for flight. Each planned route considers initial fuel, fuel 
consumption per hour, and total hours of flight, for example. When people consider, 
analyze and then select a plan, they assess fuel consumption and justify the plan by their 
calculations showing the aircraft will have sufficient fuel to execute the plan. The 
corresponding most general COI is “expected fuel consumption exceeds amount available 
(less required reserves).” Another general class of COI corresponds to the failure of an 
assumed salutary condition.  An example of this might be “absence of enemy threat along 
route of flight.” While plans may not absolutely require such a condition, it’s obviously 
desirable. In fact, in considering two alternative routes, the planner may have chosen this 
specific one precisely because of this very belief. These kinds of COIs reflect the 
importance of recognizing and adapting to events that increase the risks of failure.  
A very different category of COI addresses the importance, in some operations, of 
adapting to increased opportunities, where we see risks as “opportunity costs,” rather than 
chances of failure per se. Thus, when forecast thunderstorms dissipate, opportunities arise 
for shorter, faster, and safer routes.  
Any NCOW system should enable processing entities to get the high-value information 
they need in a form that makes it easy and quick for them to react to it. This can be done 
by enabling each PE to specify its own COIs, reflecting its own knowledge, expected 
plans, and concerns about various kinds of risks. The ability to delegate and monitor 
COIs seems critically important. Systems intended to foster information superiority must 
provide this essential capability to the human operators and automated processing 
entities. This is probably the single greatest way to use computing power to increase 
process efficiency and to assure that limited human bandwidth can focus on important 
information. 
Using COI monitoring this way supports the objective of every processing entity 
receiving valuable information at the right time (VIRT). Networks that embrace this 
process design approach will manage the flow of bits to maximize the value of those bits. 
We term that approach to network management flow by value (Hayes-Roth, 2004b, 
2005a).  
To enable processing entities to specify their COIs new language systems will be 
required, and these will constitute improved query languages. Such new language 
systems will require three principal components: 
1. Domain-specific ontologies. The concepts, variables, value intervals, and similar 
attributes required to describe the information needed for effective missions 
collectively define the domain ontology. As an example, an ontology for the 
helicopter missions would include concepts such as turbulence, icing, anti-
aircraft missile, vehicle track, ground speed, and fuel consumption.  
2. Domain-specific expressions and conditions. Expressions specify how to 
calculate quantities useful in determining whether a significant value exists, as 
well as particular values signifying important events, i.e., instances of conditions 
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of interest. Examples would include expected fuel exhaustion, expected airframe 
icing, or expected detection by a capable anti-aircraft enemy system. 
3. Condition monitors. Monitors are programs that take responsibility for 
computing conditions and alerting the interested processing entities that specified 
them. These monitors will access relevant data, compute the expressions 
associated with the conditions, and determine when the resulting values warrant 
notifying the interested entity or operator. In systems with extensive amounts of 
information, this function will be a heavy consumer of machine computing cycles. 
(Hayes-Roth & Brown, 2005, specifies an architecture for one such capability.) 
Specialized tools to help construct and continually improve these three kinds of 
components will prove extremely valuable. We might consider such tools three additional 
types of components, making a total of six important types of capabilities required to 
make COI monitoring routinely available within NCOW.  
Beyond the technology, organizations will need to adapt their processes as well. In the 
military, tactics and procedures should evolve to make COI monitoring a routine process 
suitable for automation. The military already has a related concept termed the 
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). Loosely speaking, these 
define conditions whose occurrence justifies “waking the Commander up.” In today’s 
practice, Commanders delegate CCIRs to human staff officers, and so these COIs are 
expressed informally in natural language.  
 
In order to make every processing entity efficient, we look forward to the development of 
excellent formal systems that enable people to state their COIs precisely and simply in 
terms of familiar domain ontologies. In most cases, the humans should use interactive 
language tools that allow the computer to construct unambiguous formal interpretations 
while, at the same time, simplifying human performance requirements. Once formulated, 
the COIs would be routinely delegated to computing machines that would monitor them 
reliably.  
 
We might expect these COIs to be termed something like Dynamic Operator Information 
Requirements (DOIRs). It seems straightforward to adopt a practice of explicitly defining 
DOIRs as a part of the planning process. DOIRs would be expressed in terms of the 
ontology and expressions appropriate to each domain of operation. Because all 
organizations spend most of their time repeatedly performing standard processes, most 
organizations should create a catalog of frequently used DOIRs. This would make it 
quick and easy to specify DOIRs for today’s mission, which often would be just a slight 




I’ve shared earlier drafts of this paper with a number of colleagues throughout 
government, industry and academia. They have raised a number of points that I’d like to 
mention and consider here. There are four specific points that we’ll consider in turn, and 
these are: (1) the best architecture will need to support both smart push and smart pull; 
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(2) push and pull may be misleading or harmful terms; (3) people shouldn’t depend on 
automation to provide the information they need; and (4) smart information flows require 
better semantics than our systems possess. 
 
Point 1: The best architecture will need to support both smart push and smart pull. I’ve 
tried to emphasize to this point in the paper the significant advantage of smart push over 
smart pull. The earlier example showed an advantage of more than five orders of 
magnitude in terms of reducing information to what’s essential. This is the single greatest 
quantitative advantage in efficiency that I’ve encountered in my IT career. This 
advantage isn’t yet widely understood, and many people have a poorly informed negative 
bias toward smart push, mostly stemming from early Internet products that deluged 
enterprises frequently pushing graphical data to users. Moreover, most of the GIG/NCES 
and DoD policy documents emphasize access so users can seek and pull relevant data. 
Collectively these conditions make it important to argue against the idea that smart pull is 
the solution. Not only is it not the solution, it’s not even a tolerable approach for many 
operational contexts. 
 
However, as I suggested earlier, there are many contexts where smart push is not the 
answer either. Many of these contexts involve intelligence gathering or other open-ended 
investigations. We can be confident there are countless tasks where operators would 
benefit from an ability to seek and quickly find pertinent information. After all, the most 
useful function of the Internet today would seem to be search, which is a kind of pull. So, 
a broad, effective, general IT architecture will need to support both push and pull. My 
intent is to put smart push on the agenda and to move it to a high-priority position that 
reflects its enormous advantages in many operational contexts. 
 
Point 2: Push and pull may be misleading or harmful terms. Readers have made me aware 
that these terms have been used in a variety of ways, ranging from technical to marketing 
communications, with some attendant over-loading and confusion. Hopefully, readers of 
this paper understand that I’ve been focusing on the flow of information to recipients, 
distinguishing pull flows that require recipients to periodically look for relevant data from 
push flows that cause relevant data to arrive at the recipient’s inbox. Some readers point 
out that these functions are implemented in various ways, depending on the nature of the 
distributed infrastructure, and sometimes the implementations share common elements. 
Many of the elements of the end-to-end flows, as shown in the two process models, are 
similar, of course. 
 
Nevertheless, I think it’s instructive to look at the process models at a high level and 
consider which method provides more precise information to the operator and which 
method requires less work by the operator. It should be clear that two things are required 
to maximize the ratio of value to effort: (a) the operator’s dynamic context must be used 
to determine precisely how current estimates differ from expectation, because those 
differences constitute the candidate bits of value; and (b) the system must maintain 
dynamic context and past data to detect changes of interest. In addition, additional 
benefits accrue if the system also can project future states and detect deviations between 
prior expectations and now-predicted situations. Because information becomes valuable 
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by improving an operator’s expected outcome, operators will most value bits that 
correctly alert them to the need to change course to avoid a predictable problem or 
exploit an emerging opportunity. 
 
In short, there shouldn’t be any confusion about the terms, as used in this paper. Smart 
pull means getting the most relevant information you can when you search for it. Smart 
push means letting others know your context and relying on them to alert you when they 
determine you are at risk. 
 
Point 3: People shouldn’t depend on automation to provide the information they need. 
Automation is often considered dangerous or harmful, because people may become over-
reliant upon it. When automated systems fail or when novel problems arise beyond the 
system’s boundaries, we need people to take over and provide agility and robustness. In 
this paper, for example, a reader might worry that our operators will become over-
dependent on systems to tell them what they should know. One consequence, the 
argument goes, is that we weaken our operators as a result. Smart push lulls them into a 
kind of false level of comfort and excessive dependency. 
 
I don’t think there’s anything specific to IT or smart push in such concerns. All 
automation ultimately creates dependencies and, in fact, people lose the skills previously 
required to do those functions used prior to automation. We don’t have many skillful 
slide-rule operators today, as handheld calculators and spreadsheet software have made it 
possible for everybody to do complex mathematical computations at the push of a button. 
Few people can write database queries or Boolean information retrieval queries, yet 
everybody can seek and find more data, more easily, with Internet search engines. Pilots 
of complex aircraft regularly rely on GPS for navigation, autopilots for flying, and flight 
management systems to determine routing and fuel management decisions. In short, 
technology makes us more productive precisely because it eliminates tasks that can and 
often do become obsolete. 
 
With respect to the specific question of whether smart push can provide productivity 
advantages, there’s no doubt. Will this necessarily mean operators lose the ability to find 
relevant information when they want it? Will it mean that operators will no longer be 
effective when their systems break or are unable to address new contexts? We are 
certainly a very long way from having to address those questions, because we have 
scarcely begun to address the question of how we’d give operators just the high-value 
information they’d want in various dynamic contexts. At this low baseline level on the 
productivity scale, with little technology assistance, we know that operators can’t get the 
information they need easily and quickly by any means. It seems obvious then that the 
preponderance of risk is associated with poor performance due to poor information. We 
should look forward to an eventual problem of having extremely high performance due to 
automation that provides precise, high-value information. Before operators become 
overly dependent and vulnerable in that eventual state of information superiority, we can 
introduce back up measures to increase robustness and maintain essential human skills. 
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Point 4: Smart information flows require better semantics than our systems possess. The 
examples in this paper show how smart push or pull can find relevant information and 
compute conditions of interest. To do that, operators define COIs using expressions that 
computers can evaluate. The expressions or queries use a vocabulary of entities or 
variables, attributes, and values, and often these are indexed with spatial and temporal 
coordinates. Finally, these values might be indexed by additional aspects corresponding 
to different perspectives, hypothetical cases, or other context-indicating factors. A 
schema for all these data defines what kinds of bits are stored and how they’re organized. 
 
To match data to COIs, we must recognize the correspondence between the operators’ 
concerns and the type of information modeled in the schema. In short, we need to have 
alignment in meaning between operators and the people who supply bits. Semantics is the 
term we use to refer to such meaning. As any system designer or data engineer knows, 
getting agreement on meaning is tough work, and the requirements continue to evolve as 
missions and contexts change.  
 
So smart information flows will depend upon our machines incorporating semantic 
models suitable for the tasks we apply them to. The semantic models will underlie the 
tools users employ to express their COIs and to view the alerts and events the system 
pushes to them. Information will need to be registered against appropriate coordinate 
systems and other reference frameworks for the semantics to be meaningful and correct. 
Furthermore, information might be supplied using one semantic framework, compared to 
information in another semantic framework, and ultimately presented to operators in a 
third, context-sensitive framework. All of this suggests that semantics will be important, 
and a continuing area of learning and improvement. 
 
There are many efforts underway throughout industry and government to create improved 
semantic frameworks, including ontologies and tools for comparing and translating 
between different category systems. I don’t expect this work to move especially quickly 
or reach completion in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, we don’t need complete 
solutions to begin to deliver great value to operators. We only need enough semantic 
foundations to understand COIs in specific operational contexts and correctly monitor 
evolving data relevant to those COIs. In this way, we can deliver value to operators “one 
thread at-a-time,” by implementing the semantics-enabled processes across just those 
information sources needed to monitor those COIs. If we plan for continuous 
improvement and evolution of the semantic frameworks and semantics-supported 




When we don’t really know what information we need or how it will change our 
behavior, we have few means of achieving great efficiency. In such a case we have little 
choice but to browse all potentially relevant information sources in the hope of noticing 
something interesting and, even better, something significant with respect to our situation 
or planned actions. This type of information system, consistent with Model 1, places a 
great burden on processing entities. They must seek information broadly, they must have 
Hayes-Roth, Two Theories: Smart Push v. Smart Pull  p. 19  
broad access, and they must acquire large volumes of generally relevant information. 
Then they must process it, interpret it, look for significance, filter and prioritize it. In a 
network-centric operation, we should expect such processing entities to have long 
latencies, to induce bottlenecks, and to exhibit large backlogs of interim products 
awaiting further processing. Some functions probably must be based on Model 1, such as 
some general intelligence operations, but we should expect efficient organizations to have 
few such processes. 
 
On the other hand, we should expect mature, efficient organizations to have well 
integrated value chains, where each processing entity allocates most of its time to near 
immediate adaptive responses to exceptions, events that don’t jibe with expectations and 
that jeopardize desired outcomes still in process. Efficient systems strive to achieve the 
best possible results by using reliable processes, each step adding value in predictable 
ways, and all operating within an envelope of nominal conditions. These systems spend 
most of their resources adding value by building in predictability through methods that 
minimize variance, reduce friction, and prevent the off-nominal unexpected. In the rare 
cases where conditions go off-nominal and the expected consequences are negative, the 
systems quickly notice them, because they are actively monitoring for just those kinds of 
expectable problematic conditions. In these systems, significant events occur 
infrequently. Further, the processing entities have mostly short queues with no backlogs, 
meaning they have capacity to deal with urgent events.  As a result, these systems can 
give priority immediately to understanding a surprising event, contemplating its negative 
impact, and considering adaptive responses. Model 2, in short, allocates scarce attentional 
and problem-solving resources, often dependent on humans, in a near optimal way to 
recognizing and responding to vital and urgent events.  
 
The theory of NCOW, roughly, predicts that we should be able to accomplish better 
results by distributing information quickly to everyone who could benefit from it. That 
seems like a good idea. However, Theory 1 and Theory 2 suggest two complementary 
strategies for achieving those improved outcomes. This paper shows that most advances 
in information technology, ranging from increased processing power to formal semantics, 
advanced query processing and knowledge-based inference, contribute significantly 
greater productivity gains in the context of integrated supply chains operated according to 
Theory 2. For this reason, organizations should give priority to designing and 
implementing processes as Theory 2 suggests. 
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